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FAIR DIVISION WITH MULTIPLE PIECES
KATHRYN NYMAN, FRANCIS EDWARD SU, AND SHIRA ZERBIB
Abstract. Given a set of p players we consider problems con-
cerning envy-free allocation of collections of k pieces from a given
set of goods or chores. We show that if p ≤ n and each player
can choose k pieces out of n pieces of a cake, then there exist a
division of the cake and an allocation of the pieces where at least
p
2(k2−k+1) players get their desired k pieces each. We further show
that if p ≤ k(n − 1) + 1 and each player can choose k pieces, one
from each of k cakes that are divided into n pieces each, then there
exist a division of the cakes and allocation of the pieces where at
least p2k(k−1) players get their desired k pieces. Finally we prove
that if p ≥ k(n−1)+1 and each player can choose one shift in each
of k days that are partitioned into n shifts each, then, given that
the salaries of the players are fixed, there exist n(1 + ln k) players
covering all the shifts, and moreover, if k = 2 then n players suffice.
Our proofs combine topological methods and theorems of Fu¨redi,
Lova´sz and Gallai from hypergraph theory.
1. Introduction
Consider a group of people who are interested in sharing a house and
office space. Is there a way to allocate rent on the rooms of the house
and office building in such a way that all of the rooms will be rented,
and each renter will get their first choice of room in each building? And
given an employer with a pool of potential workers, can they guarantee
a small number of workers can be hired to cover all necessary shifts?
In this paper, we examine several fair division questions pertaining
to the allocation of multiple pieces of goods (or bads) to players. Our
goal will be to divide multiple goods fairly among a group of people: we
seek to divide multiple cakes such that players receive one piece from
each cake, we wish to assign shifts on multiple days to workers so that
all shift are covered, and we seek to assign rents to rooms in multiple
buildings so that players prefer disjoint rooms in each building. We
also consider the problem of assigning multiple pieces of a single cake
to players.
Since it is not always possible in these multi-piece allocation prob-
lems to make all players in an arbitrary group happy, our results assume
1
2 KATHRYN NYMAN, FRANCIS EDWARD SU, AND SHIRA ZERBIB
a larger initial set of “potential players” and guarantee that some frac-
tion of them can be satisfied with a distribution of pieces. In all of
our problems, we seek to allocate pieces to players in such a way that
they each receive their most preferred set of pieces in a given division,
chosen over the set of all possible collections of pieces in that division.
This makes the allocation envy-free, as the player would not wish to
trade pieces with any other player. It also makes the allocation Pareto-
optimal, as no shuffling of the pieces among players would make any of
the players happier (as they all have their top choice of pieces).
The problem of dividing a single cake among a group of players has
been extensively studied (see, e.g. [2, 16]). More recently, the divi-
sion of multiple goods or bads has been examined. Cloutier, et.al. [3]
showed that when dividing two cakes into two pieces each, it is not
always possible to satisfy the preferences of the two players if each of
them chooses one piece of each cake. However, if the number of players
is increased, or the number of pieces is increased, then it can be guar-
anteed that there are two players whose choices of pieces in each cake
are disjoint. Hence, both these players can be satisfied simultaneously.
Note that in this problem, if the number of players is increased, or the
number of pieces is increased (but both are not increased together),
then there is either a player who does not receive any cake, or a piece
of cake that has not been distributed to any player. We can consider
these “left out” players or pieces as being the price of a disjoint, envy-
free distribution of cake, as it may be impossible to satisfy two players
otherwise.
Lebert et. al. [13] extended the work in [3] to show an upper bound
on the number of pieces necessary to guarantee that m cakes can be
divided in an envy-free manner among two players. Here again, each of
the two players receives a disjoint, envy-free set of pieces of the cakes,
but there are extra pieces not allocated to any player.
Dual to the notion of dividing goods, one can ask about dividing
“bads”, or chores, which leads to the problem of rental division. In
[18], Su showed that a division of rent among rooms in a house can
be achieved so that each roommate prefers a different room. In a
surprising result, Frick et. al. [6] show that an envy-free rent division
can be achieved among n people, even if the preferences of only n− 1
housemates are known.
However, when we extend the question to division of rent in multi-
ple houses (say a bedroom house and an office building that are being
rented to a set of roommates together), then, as in the case of dividing
multiple cakes, it may be impossible to make every player happy si-
multaneously. Already in the case of two players and two houses with
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two rooms each, an example where there is no envy-free division of the
rent is known (see Theorem 3 of [3]).
We now summarize our results. Our proofs are topological, and
combine extensions of KKM-type theorems with tools from hypergraph
theory.
Our first theorem gives a lower bound on the number of players who
prefer mutually disjoint pieces in the case where one cake is divided
into n pieces and players chooses k pieces each. We imagine a set of
potential players who, when presented with some division of the cake,
have a preferred set of k pieces. We strive for divisions in which we can
maximize the number of players whose preferred k pieces are disjoint,
since those players can be satisfied simultaneously.
Theorem 1.1. Suppose a cake is to be divided into n pieces, and there
are p ≤ n hungry players who satisfy the following conditions
(1) in any division of cake into n pieces, each player finds some
subset of k pieces acceptable, and
(2) player preference sets are closed: a piece that is acceptable for
a convergent sequence of divisions will also be acceptable in the
limiting division.
Then there exists a division of the cake into n pieces where at least
⌈ p
2(k2−k+1)
⌉ players prefer mutually disjoint sets of k pieces. Moreover,
if p divides n then there exists a division of the cake into n pieces where
at least ⌈ p
k2−k+1
⌉ players prefer mutually disjoint sets of k pieces.
This theorem is proved in Section 4.
Our second theorem involves dividing k cakes into n pieces each. We
call a choice of one piece in each cake a k-piece selection.
Theorem 1.2. Suppose that there are k cakes and p ≤ k(n − 1) +
1 hungry players, each of whom finds at least one k-piece selection
acceptable in any division of the cakes into n pieces each. If all player
preference sets are closed then there exists a division of the k cakes
into n pieces each such that at least ⌈ p
2k(k−1)
⌉ players prefer mutually
disjoint k-piece selections. Moreover, if p divides k(n − 1) + 1 then
there exists a division where at least ⌈ p
k(k−1)
⌉ players prefer mutually
disjoint k-piece selections.
We prove this Theorem in Section 5.
Our final fair division result gives conditions under which an em-
ployer can cover all necessary work shifts on k days with a small num-
ber of employees. In this scenario, an employer seeks to divide k work
days into n shifts each in such a way that s/he is able to cover all of
the shifts with a limited number of employees. We prove the following.
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Theorem 1.3. Suppose that a set of p ≥ k(n−1)+1 employees satisfies
the following conditions:
(1) For any partition of k days into n shifts each, every employee
finds at least one selection of k shifts, one in each day, accept-
able.
(2) The employees prefer empty shifts, if available.
(3) The employees’ preference sets are closed.
Then there exists a partition of k days into n shifts each for which a
subset of at most n(1+ln k) employees cover all the kn shifts. Moreover,
if k = 2 there exists a subset of n employees that cover all the 2n shifts.
This result is an extension of Theorem 1.5 of [1] which can be inter-
preted to define the preferences of potential employees more narrowly.
There one imagines a scenario in which potential employees submit in
advance a personal time schedule, consisting of one time interval per
day, during which s/he is willing work. Our Theorem 1.3 generalizes
this result to every model of employee shift preferences, where employee
daily schedules are not necessarily single intervals, nor predetermined.
For the proof of Theorem 1.3 we prove a combinatorial dual exten-
sion of the topological KKMS theorem of Shapley [9] to products of
simplices, where dualization happens in each factor. Let ∆n−1 be the
(n−1)-dimensional simplex and let P (n, k) = (∆n−1)
k be the k(n−1)-
dimensional polytope obtained by taking the Cartesian product of k
copies of ∆n−1. Let T be a triangulation of P (n, k). We say that
a function ℓ : V (T ) → [n]k is a factorwise-dual-Sperner labeling of
T if for every v = (v1, . . . , vk) ∈ V (T ) and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, if
[n] \ supp(vi) 6= ∅, we have ℓ(v)i ∈ [n] \ supp(vi), where supp(vi) is the
minimal face of ∆n−1 containing vi. We further say that two factorwise-
dual-Sperner labelings ℓ, ℓ′ : V (T )→ [n]k are equivalent if ℓ(v)i = ℓ
′(v)i
whenever [n] \ supp(vi) = ∅. We prove:
Theorem 1.4. If T is a triangulation of P (n, k) with a factorwise-
dual-Sperner labeling ℓ, then it has an equivalent labeling ℓ′ with an
elementary simplex Q in T , such that the set of labels Λ(Q) = {ℓ′(v) |
v ∈ V (Q)} is balanced with respect to V = V1⊔ · · · ⊔Vk, where Vi = [n]
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Here “balanced” means that one can find non-negative weights on
Λ(Q) such that the sum of weights in each component is 1. Theorems
1.3 and 1.4 are proved in Section 6.
A Corollary of Theorem 1.3 guarantees an envy-free way to rent out
all of the rooms in two n-room buildings, given an adequate pool of
potential renters. Consider a set of colleagues, each of whom prefers free
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rooms if available, has closed preference sets, and in any division of the
rents finds a collection of two rooms, one in each building, acceptable.
Corollary 1.5. If 2n − 1 such players seek to rent two rooms, one
in each of two buildings containing n rooms each, then there exists a
division of rents in which a subset of n players each get their preferred
two rooms.
2. Preliminaries in hypergraph theory
A hypergraph is a pair H = (V,E) where V = V (H) is a vertex
set, and E = E(H) is a finite collection of subsets of V called edges.
A hypergraph H = (V,E) is k-partite if there exists a partition V =
V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vk where every edge e ∈ E has |e ∩ Vi| = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
A 2-partite hypergraph is a bipartite graph. The rank of a hypergraph
H = (V,E), denoted rank(H), is the maximum size of an edge in E,
and the degree of a vertex v ∈ V , denoted deg(v), is the number of
edges in E containing v. A hypergraph H = (V,E) is k-uniform if
|e| = k for all e ∈ E.
A matching in a hypergraph H = (V,E) is a set of disjoint edges.
The matching number ν(H) is the maximal size of a matching in H .
A fractional matching of H is a function f : E → [0, 1], such that
for every v ∈ V we have
∑
e:v∈e f(e) ≤ 1. We can think of f(e) as
the weight of edge e in the formal sum
∑
e∈E f(e) · e, where at each
vertex v, the sum of coefficient of edges containing v is at most 1. The
fractional matching number of H is denoted by ν∗(H) and is defined as
ν∗(H) = max
{∑
e∈E
f(e) | f is a fractional matching of H
}
.
A fractional matching f : E(H)→ [0, 1] is called perfect if for every
v ∈ V we have
∑
e:v∈e f(e) = 1. A collection of sets E ⊂ 2
V is balanced
with respect to a set V if the hypergraph H = (V,E) has a perfect
fractional matching.
For example, consider the vertex set V = {1, 2, 3, 1¯, 2¯, 3¯}, with edge
set comprised of all pairs of vertices with one barred and one un-barred
vertex. Then the edge set {e1 = (11¯), e2 = (21¯), e3 = (12¯), e4 =
(22¯), e5 = (33¯)} is balanced with respect to V since there are edge
weights that sum to 1 at each vertex. In particular, 1
2
e1 +
1
2
e2 +
1
2
e3 +
1
2
e4 + 1e5 is a perfect fractional matching.
A cover of a hypergraph H = (V,E) is a subset of vertices that
intersect every edge. The covering number τ(H) is the minimal size of
a cover in H . A fractional cover of H is a function g : V → [0, 1], such
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that for every e ∈ E we have
∑
v:v∈e g(v) ≥ 1. The fractional covering
number of H is
τ ∗(H) = min
{∑
v∈V
g(v) | g is a fractional covering of H
}
.
A perfect fractional cover ofH is a fractional cover with
∑
v:v∈e g(v) = 1
for every e ∈ E. By linear programming duality, we have ν(H) ≤
ν∗(H) = τ ∗(H) ≤ τ(H) for every hypergraph H .
Lemma 2.1. If a hypergraph H = (V,E) of rank n has a perfect frac-
tional matching, then ν∗(H) ≥ |V |
n
. If, in addition, H is n-uniform,
then ν∗(H) = |V |
n
.
Proof. Let f : E → [0, 1] be a perfect fractional matching of H . Then
(1)
∑
v∈V
∑
e:v∈e
f(e) =
∑
v∈V
1 = |V |.
Since f(e) was counted |e| ≤ n times in (1) for every edge e ∈ E(H),
we have that
ν∗(H) ≥
∑
e∈E
f(e) ≥
|V |
n
.
If H is n-uniform, then the constant function g : V → { 1
n
} is a frac-
tional cover and therefore ν∗(H) = τ ∗(H) ≤ |V |
n
. Combining with the
inequality above, we have ν∗(H) = |V |
n
. 
We will use the following bounds on the ratio ν∗/ν and τ/τ ∗:
Theorem 2.2 (Fu¨redi [5]). If H is a hypergraph of rank n ≥ 2, then
ν(H) ≥ ν
∗(H)
n−1+ 1
n
. If H is n-partite, then ν(H) ≥ ν
∗(H)
n−1
.
Theorem 2.3 (Lova´sz [14]). If H is a hypergraph with maximal degree
d, then τ(H) ≤ (1 + ln d)τ ∗(H).
The dual hypergraph HD = (U, F ) of a hypergraph H = (V,E) is
obtained by reversing the roles of vertices and edges, namely, U = E,
F = V , and an edge v ∈ F consists of all the vertices e ∈ U for which
v ∈ e in H . If H is d-uniform then deg(e) = d for all e ∈ U and we
have the following corollary of Theorem 2.3:
Corollary 2.4. Let H be a d-uniform hypergraph then τ(HD) ≤ (1 +
ln d)τ ∗(HD).
If H is a bipartite graph then the situation is even better:
Theorem 2.5 (Gallai [10]). If H is a bipartite graph then τ(HD) =
τ ∗(HD).
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3. Complete triangulations of polytopes
Let T be a triangulation of a (d − 1)-dimensional polytope P and
let V (T ) be the vertices (0-dimensional faces) of T . The (d − 1)-
dimensional faces of T are called the elementary simplices of T . For
each vertex v ∈ V (T ) we assign an owner ov ∈ [d] (where [d] is thought
of as a set of players). Such an assignment will be said to be complete
if every elementary simplex Q in T has {ov | v ∈ V (Q)} = [d] and
a triangulation will be called complete if it has a complete ownership
assignment.
Lemma 3.1. Every d-dimensional polytope P has a complete triangu-
lation.
Proof. Let T be any triangulation of P . Then the first subdivision T ′
of T is a complete triangulation of P , with the assignment ov = i if
v ∈ V (T ′) is the barycenter of an (i− 1)-dimensional face of T . 
4. Allocating multiple pieces of one cake to players
In this section, we consider dividing one cake into n pieces and assign-
ing k pieces to each player. We imagine that our cake is rectangular,
and is divided by parallel vertical cuts. We represent the division of the
cake into n pieces by the n-tuple ~x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n
≥0 satisfying∑n
i=1 xi = 1, where xi denotes the width of piece i. The space of all
possible divisions of one cake into n pieces can therefore be realized by
the (n− 1)-dimensional simplex ∆n−1.
The preferences of an individual player can be visualized as a covering
of the space of divisions of the cake by sets corresponding to all possible
collections of k pieces. Each point in the space is assigned to the set
corresponding to the k pieces that the player would prefer if the cake
were cut according to that division. We note that it is possible for a
point to belong to multiple sets if the player is indifferent to more than
one collection of k pieces in the given division.
We make the following natural assumptions on player preferences.
(1) The players are hungry: no player prefers an empty piece of
cake to a non-empty piece.
(2) The players have closed preference sets: if a player prefers a
given set of k pieces in a sequence of divisions that approach a
limit, then the player prefers that same set of k pieces in the
cut corresponding to the limit of the sequence of divisions.
For t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ R
n define the support of t to be the set
supp(t) = {i | ti 6= 0}. Our main tool in the proof of Theorem 1.1
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is a generalization of Sperner’s lemma, due to Shapley [9], in which
vertices have subsets of labels (rather than single labels):
Theorem 4.1 (Shapley [9]). If T is a triangulation of ∆n−1 with a
labeling L : V (T ) → 2[n] such that L(v) ⊆ supp(v), then there exists
an elementary simplex Q in T where the set {L(v) | v ∈ V (Q)} is a
balanced set with respect to [n].
Combining Theorems 4.1 and 2.2 we obtain the following.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 4.1 hold,
and in addition |L(v)| ≤ k for every v ∈ V (T ). Then there exists an
elementary simplex Q in T , and a collection M of n
k2−k+1
vertices of
Q, such that the sets {L(v) | v ∈ M} are pairwise disjoint.
Proof. By Theorem 4.1, there exists an elementary simplex Q in T
where the set T = {L(v) | v ∈ V (Q)} is a balanced set with respect
to [n]. Therefore, the hypergraph H = ([n], T ) has a perfect fractional
matching. Since every edge in T is of size at most k, by Lemma 2.1 we
have that ν∗(H) ≥ |V |
k
= n
k
. Therefore, by Theorem 2.2,
ν(H) ≥
ν∗(H)
k − 1 + 1
k
≥
n
k2 − k + 1
.
We conclude that T contains a matching M ′ of size at least n
k2−k+1
,
which corresponds to a subset M of vertices of Q. 
We are now ready to prove our first main result which we restate.
Theorem 1.1. Suppose a cake is to be divided into n pieces, and there
are p ≤ n hungry players who satisfy the following conditions
(1) in any division of cake into n pieces, each player finds some
subset of k pieces acceptable, and
(2) player preference sets are closed: a piece that is acceptable for
a convergent sequence of divisions will also be acceptable in the
limiting division.
Then there exists a division of the cake into n pieces where at least
⌈ p
2(k2−k+1)
⌉ players prefer mutually disjoint sets of k pieces. Moreover,
if p divides n then there exists a division of the cake into n pieces where
at least ⌈ p
k2−k+1
⌉ players prefer mutually disjoint sets of k pieces.
Proof. Let S be the set of players with |S| = p. We duplicate each
player ⌈n
p
⌉ times and choose a set S ′ of size n from the copies of players.
By Lemma 3.1 there exists a complete triangulation T of ∆n−1. Let
ov ∈ S
′ be the owner of v ∈ V (T ) in a complete assignment.
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Every vertex v ∈ V (T ) corresponds to a division of the cake into n
pieces. Let the labeling L(v) of v be the preferred k-piece selection of
ov. Since ov is hungry, we have L(v) ⊆ supp(v). Thus, by Theorem 4.2
there exists an elementary simplex Q in T , with the following property:
there exists a subset M ′ of the vertices of Q such that |M ′| ≥ ⌈ n
k2−k+1
⌉
and the set {L(v) | v ∈ M ′} consists of pairwise disjoint subsets of
[n] of size k each, that represent pairwise disjoint k-piece selections by
⌈ n
k2−k+1
⌉ players in S ′. But since every player in S is represented in
S ′ by at most ⌈n
p
⌉ copies and p ≤ n, there must be a set M ⊂ M ′
representing pairwise disjoint k-piece selections by different players in
S, with
|M | ≥
⌈ n
k2−k+1
⌉
⌈n
p
⌉
≥
p
2(k2 − k + 1)
,
and if p divides n then this improves to |M | ≥ p
k2−k+1
.
Write m = ⌈ p
k2−k+1
⌉ if p divides n, and m = ⌈ p
2(k2−k+1)
⌉ otherwise.
To show the existence of a single division of the cake that would satisfy
at least m players, carry out the procedure above for a sequence of
finer and finer complete triangulations T . By compactness of ∆n−1
and decreasing size of the elementary simplices, there must exist a
subsequence Q = Q1, Q2, . . . of elementary simplices converging to a
single point, such that in each Qi there are at least m players of S that
have pairwise disjoint k-piece selections. Since there are finitely many
subsets of the player set S, and each player has a closed preference set,
there must exists a subset N ⊂ S of players of size |N | = m for which
the limit point of Q corresponds to a division of the cake in which the
players in N are satisfied with different sets of k pieces. 
5. Dividing multiple cakes
We now turn to the problem of dividing multiple cakes among a set
of potential players. We will be dividing k cakes into n pieces each,
and hence our space of all possible divisions will be realized by the
k(n− 1)-dimensional polytope P (n, k) which is defined as the product
of k simplices of dimension n− 1 each, that is,
P (n, k) = (∆n−1)
k = ∆n−1 × · · · ×∆n−1.
Every face of P (n, k) is given by F (J1, . . . , Jk) = ∆
J1 × · · · × ∆Jk for
some choice of subsets J1, . . . , Jk of [n], where ∆
S is the face of ∆n−1
spanned by the vertices in S ⊂ [n].
The KKMS theorem is a continuous version of Theorem 4.1. A the-
orem of Komiya [8] implies the following generalization of the KKMS
theorem to the polytope P (n, k):
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Theorem 5.1 (Komiya [8]). Let B(i1,...,ik) be a closed subset of P =
P (n, k) for every k-tuple (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ [n]
k, such that for every J1, . . . , Jk ⊆
[n] we have
F (J1, . . . , Jk) ⊆
⋃{
B(i1,...,ik) | ij ∈ Jj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k
}
.
Then there exists a balanced collection of tuples I =
{
I t = (it1, . . . , i
t
k) ∈
[n]k | 1 ≤ t ≤ m
}
with respect to the vertex set V = V1 ⊔ · · · ⊔
Vk, the disjoint union where Vi = [n] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that⋂m
t=1B(it1,...,itn) 6= ∅.
Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 5.1 hold. Then by the theo-
rem, we obtain a k-partite hypergraph H on vertex set V = V1⊔· · ·⊔Vk
with an edge set I =
{
I t = (it1, . . . , i
t
k) ∈ [n]
k | 1 ≤ t ≤ m
}
that has
a perfect fractional matching. Since every edge in I is of size k, by
Lemma 2.1 we have that ν∗(H) ≥ |V |
k
= kn
k
= n. Therefore, by Theo-
rem 2.2 we have ν(H) ≥ ν
∗(H)
k−1
≥ n
k−1
. We conclude that I contains a
matching M of size at least n
k−1
and
⋂
It∈M BIt 6= ∅.
Thus we proved:
Proposition 5.2. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 5.1 hold.
Then there exists a pairwise disjoint collection of k-tuples
{
I t = (it1, . . . , i
t
k) ∈ [n]
k | 1 ≤ t ≤ m
}
such that m ≥ n
k−1
and
⋂m
t=1BIt 6= ∅.
Here is a discrete version of Proposition 5.2:
Proposition 5.3. Let T be a triangulation of P (n, k) with labeling ℓ :
V (T )→ [n]k such that if v = (v1, . . . , vk), then ℓ(v) = (ℓ1(v), . . . , ℓk(v))
where ℓi(v) ∈ supp(vi). Then there exists an elementary simplex Q in
T , with the following property: there exists a subset M of V (Q) such
that |M | ≥ n
k−1
and the set {ℓ(v) | v ∈M} consists of pairwise disjoint
k-tuples.
Proof. Let T ′ be the first barycentric subdivision of T . For every k-
tuple I = (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ [n]
k, we set VI = {v ∈ T | L(v) = I} and
let BI be the union of all elementary simplices S of T
′ with V (S) ∩
VI 6= ∅. Then the sets BI satisfy the conditions of Proposition 5.2, so
considering the conclusion, every point x ∈
⋂m
t=1BIt lies in simplex of
T that contains M in its vertex set. 
We are now ready to prove our second main theorem:
Theorem 1.2 Suppose that there are k cakes and p ≤ k(n − 1) +
1 hungry players, each of whom finds at least one k-piece selection
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acceptable in any division of the cakes into n pieces each. If all player
preference sets are closed then there exists a division of the k cakes
into n pieces each such that at least ⌈ p
2k(k−1)
⌉ players prefer mutually
disjoint k-piece selections. Moreover, if p divides k(n − 1) + 1 then
there exists a division where at least ⌈ p
k(k−1)
⌉ players prefer mutually
disjoint k-piece selections.
Proof. Let S be the set of players with |S| = p. As in the proof of
Theorem 1.1, we duplicate each player ⌈k(n−1)+1
p
⌉ times and choose a
set S ′ of size k(n−1)+1 from the copies of the players. By Lemma 3.1,
there exists a complete triangulation T of the polytope P = P (n, k).
Let ov ∈ S
′ be the owner of v ∈ V (T ) in a complete assignment.
Every vertex v = (v1, . . . , vk) ∈ V (T ) (vi ∈ ∆n−1) corresponds to a
division of the k cakes into n pieces each. Define a labelling ℓ : V (T )→
[n]k by setting ℓ(v) to be the k-tuple representing the k-piece selection,
one from each cake, that the player ov prefers. Since ov is hungry, we
have ℓi(v) ∈ supp(vi) for each i ∈ [k]. Thus, by Proposition 5.3, there
exists an elementary simplex Q in T , with the following property: there
exists a subset M ′ of the vertices of Q such that |M ′| ≥ ⌈ n
k−1
⌉ and the
set {ℓ(v) | v ∈M ′} consists of pairwise disjoint k-tuples, that represent
pairwise disjoint k-piece selections of ⌈ n
k−1
⌉ players in S ′.
Now, since every player in S is represented in S ′ by at most ⌈k(n−1)+1
p
⌉
copies, there must be a set M ⊂M ′ of vertices in Q owned by disjoint
players in S, with
|M | ≥
⌈ n
k−1
⌉
⌈k(n−1)+1
p
⌉
≥
p
2k(k − 1)
,
and if p divides k(n− 1) + 1 then |M | ≥ p
k(k−1)
.
A similar argument to the one made in the proof of Theorem 1.1
now shows the existence of a single cut of the k cakes into n pieces
each that would satisfy at least p
2(k2−k)
players, or p
k(k−1)
players in the
case p divides k(n− 1) + 1. 
We note that the techniques in this proof are similar to those used
by Lebert, et. al. [13] to prove that if there are only two players then,
for large enough n, there exists a division of the k cakes into n pieces
each in which both players prefer pairwise disjoint k pieces, one from
each cake.
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6. Assigning Shifts to Players
Our last allocation problem involves an employer who wishes to as-
sign all shifts on a set of days to a collection of employees. We look for
a small set of employees who can cover all of the shifts. This would be
a useful consideration if, for example, the employees were all receiving
fixed salaries, and so the employer wishes to spend the least amount
of money to cover all of the shifts. Moreover, it is natural to assume
(and we will make this assumption) that if the salaries are fixed then
every employee prefers an empty shift (a shift that requires no time at
work), if one is available.
We also assume that if there are multiple empty shifts, then players
are indifferent between them. This is actually a consequence of having
closed preference sets, since the division with multiple empty shifts is
the limit of divisions in which a single fixed room is free.
We call a choice of one shift on each of k days a k-shift selection.
We note that in a typical solution to our problem, more employees
are needed than there are shifts each day. This indicates that some
shifts will be covered by more than one employee, or some employees
can be sent home early.
Consider a polytope P with a triangulation T . A labeling of T is
said to be Sperner if the vertices of P have distinct labels, and vertices
of T that lie on a minimal face F of P have labels chosen from the
labels of the vertices of P spanning the face F . A simplex of T is said
to be a full cell if its vertices have distinct labels. We will require the
following result from [4] which comes from a generalization of Sperner’s
Lemma to polytopes.
Theorem 6.1 (DeLoera-Peterson-Su [4]). Let P be an d-dimensional
polytope with n vertices together with a Sperner-labeled triangulation
T . Let f : P → P be the piecewise-linear map that takes each vertex
of T to the vertex of P that shares the same label, and is linear on
elementary simplex of T . Then the map f is surjective, and thus the
collection of full cells in T forms a cover of P under f .
Each point in the product of simplices P (n, k) represents a division
of k days into n shifts each. Let T be a triangulation of P (n, k). We
shall label every vertex v = (v1, . . . , vk) ∈ V (T ) (where vi ∈ ∆n−1) with
a k-tuple ℓ(v) = (ℓ1(v), . . . , ℓk(v)) in [n]
k that will represent a desirable
shift selection for some player.
We now define a labeling condition to describe the fact that players
prefer empty shifts when available. For any x ∈ ∆n−1, let empty(x) =
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[n] \ supp(x). We say a labeling ℓ : V (T ) → [n]k is factorwise-dual-
Sperner if whenever empty(vi) 6= ∅, we have ℓi(v) ∈ empty(vi). Since
players are indifferent between empty shifts when there are more than
one, we define also a notion of equivalent labelings that allow for
switching preferences between empty shifts. We say two factorwise-
dual-Sperner labelings ℓ, ℓ′ : V (T ) → [n]k are equivalent if whenever
empty(vi) = ∅, we have ℓi(v) = ℓ
′
i(v).
For the proof of Theorem 1.3 we need a dual-Sperner-type result for
P (n, k). This is Theorem 1.4 that we restate and prove here. For its
proof we employ a technique used by Frick, et. al. [6] to give a Sperner
labeling in their rental division problem with a secretive housemate.
Theorem 1.4 If T is a triangulation of P (n, k) with a factorwise-
dual-Sperner labeling ℓ, then it has an equivalent labeling ℓ′ with an
elementary simplex Q in T , such that the set of labels Λ(Q) = {ℓ′(v) |
v ∈ V (Q)} is balanced with respect to V = V1⊔ · · · ⊔Vk, where Vi = [n]
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Proof. We will construct an equivalent Sperner labeling ℓ′ of T . First
for any J ⊂ [n], let J + 1 denote the set {i + 1 | i ∈ J}, where for
the purposes of this definition we set n + 1 = 1, so that J + 1 cycles
the indices in J by shifting each by 1. Note that if J 6= [n], then
(J + 1) \ J 6= ∅.
Given v ∈ V (T ), set ℓ′i(v) = ℓi(v) for all i such that empty(vi) = ∅.
For all other i, set Ji = supp(vi) and set ℓ
′
i(v) = ji + 1 for some
ji + 1 ∈ (Ji + 1) \ Ji. This choice clearly satisfies ℓ
′
i(v) ∈ empty(vi).
Then ℓ′ is a factorwise-dual-Sperner labeling that is equivalent to ℓ.
We claim that ℓ′ is a Sperner labeling of T . To prove this, we have
to show that (a) the vertices of P (n, k) receive pairwise distinct labels
in ℓ′, and (b) the label ℓ′(v) of v ∈ V (T ) matches one of the labels
of the vertices of supp(v) in P (n, k). To see (a), observe that for any
vertex w of P (n, k) and any i ∈ [k], the set Ji = supp(wi) is a singleton,
and any two vertices of P (n, k) will differ in Ji for at least one i. For
(b), note that a point v ∈ P (n, k) is on a face spanned by a vertex w
if and only if supp(wi) ⊂ supp(vi) for all i. Now, given v ∈ V (T ) let
w = (w1, . . . , wk) be the vertex of P (n, k) where supp(wi) = {ℓ
′
i(v)−1}
for each i. Then by our definition of ℓ′ we have ℓ′i(w) = (ℓ
′
i(v)−1)+1 =
ℓ′i(v) and ℓ
′
i(v)− 1 ∈ supp(vi). Thus, v and w have the same label and
v lies on a face spanned by w.
Thus, by Theorem 6.1, there is an elementary simplex Q in T whose
image under the piecewise linear map f of Theorem 6.1 contains the
barycenter of P (n, k). The labels of the vertices of Q therefore form a
balanced set with respect to the vertex set V . 
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Combining Theorem 1.4 with Corollary 2.4 we have:
Proposition 6.2. Let T be a complete triangulation of P (n, k) with
factorwise-dual-Sperner labeling ℓ : V (T ) → [n]k. Then there exists
an equivalent labeling ℓ′, an elementary simplex Q in T , and a subset
U ⊂ V (Q) of size:
• |U | = n when k = 2, or
• |U | ≤ n(1 + ln k) when k ≥ 2,
such that the set Λ(U) = {ℓ′(u) = (ℓ′1(u), . . . , ℓ
′
k(u)) | u ∈ U} has the
property that for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [k] there exists u ∈ U for which
ℓ′j(u) = i.
Proof. Given ℓ, by Theorem 1.4 there exist an equivalent Sperner la-
beling ℓ′ and an elementary simplex Q in T such that the set of labels
Λ(Q) = {ℓ′(v) | v ∈ V (Q)} is balanced with respect to V = V1⊔· · ·⊔Vk.
Therefore, the hypergraph H = (V,Λ(Q)) has a perfect fractional
matching f : Λ(Q) → [0, 1]. Since H is k-uniform, we have that
ν∗(H) = kn/k = n.
Equivalently, in the dual hypergraph HD, f is a perfect fractional
cover, and τ ∗(HD) = n. By Corollary 2.4, we obtain τ(HD) ≤ (1 +
ln k)τ ∗(HD) = (1+ln k)n, and if k = 2, then by Theorem 2.5, τ(HD) =
τ ∗(HD) = n. Thus the hypergraph HD on vertex set Λ(Q) and edges
V has a cover of size t where t ≤ (1+ lnk)n, and moreover, t = n when
k = 2. By the definition of HD, this means that there exists a set of
vertices U ⊂ V (Q) of size |U | = t such that the set of labelings of U
cover each v ∈ V . That is, for every j ∈ [k] and i ∈ Vj = [n] there
exists u ∈ U for which ℓ′j(u) = i. 
We now prove our last main theorem.
Theorem 1.3 Suppose that a set of p ≥ k(n−1)+1 employees satisfies
the following conditions:
(1) For any partition of k days into n shift each, every employee
finds at least one k-shift selection acceptable.
(2) The employees prefer empty shifts, if available.
(3) All employee preference sets are closed.
Then there exists a partition of k days into n shifts each for which a
subset of at most n(1+ln k) employees cover all the kn shifts. Moreover,
if k = 2 there exists a subset of n employees that cover all the 2n shifts.
Proof. Fix a subset S of k(n − 1) + 1 players. By Lemma 3.1, there
exists a complete triangulation T of P = P (n, k). Let ov ∈ S be the
owner of v ∈ V (T ) in a complete assignment.
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Every vertex v = (v1, . . . , vk) ∈ V (T ) corresponds to an partition
of the k days into n shifts each. Let the labeling ℓ(v) be the shift
selection chosen by ov: one shift on each day. Since ov prefers empty
shifts, for each j we have ℓj(v) ∈ empty(vj) whenever empty(vj) 6= ∅.
When more than one empty shift exists on a particular day, we can
reassign the label for that day if needed, as in the proof of Theorem 1.4,
to obtain a factorwise-dual-Sperner labeling ℓ′. Thus, by Proposition
6.2, there exists an elementary simplex Q in T and U ⊂ V (Q) of size
|U | ≤ n(1+ln k) (or |U | = n if k = 2), such that the set {ℓ′(u) | u ∈ U}
has the property that for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [k] there exists u ∈ U
for which ℓ′j(u) is i. This corresponds to a cover of the shifts.
A similar argument to the one made in the proof of Theorem 1.2
now shows the existence of a single partition of the days into shifts in
which the k-shift selection of at most of n(1 + ln k) employees (or n
employees if k = 2) cover every shift. 
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